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Coercion-Resistant Hybrid Voting Systems
Abstract
This paper proposes hybrid voting systems as a solution for the vote
buying and voter coercion problem of electronic voting systems. The key
idea is to allow voters to revoke and overrule their electronic votes at the
polling station. We analyze the potential and pitfalls of such revocation
procedures and give concrete recommendations on how to build a hybrid
system offering coercion-resistance based on this feature. Our solution
may be of interest to governments which aim at integrating paper-based
and electronic voting systems rather than replacing the former by the
latter.
1 Introduction
In consideration of the complexity and manyfold vulnerabilities of today’s com-
puters and networks, most governments pursue a cautious strategy in introduc-
ing electronic means into processes that are so fundamental for running their
democracy. Their reservation is particularly distinctive if the technology in-
volves components that are not under their control. The number of countries
experimenting with electronic voting over the Internet is therefore still marginal.
Estonia and Switzerland, two of the few pioneering countries in Internet elec-
tions and referendums (we shall use the general term voting), follow the strategy
to slowly increase the number of electronic votes over the years [Die02]. The
idea behind keeping this shift at a slow pace is to limit the risk and conse-
quences of fraud in the early stage of the respective project. The legitimacy
of such concerns has been demonstrated by the negative e-voting experience in
the Netherlands, where all nationwide e-voting activities have been stopped in
2007, after the vulnerability of the deployed system had been exposed in public
[Loe08]. In the foreseeable future, traditional and electronic voting systems are
therefore expected to live side by side for quite some time.
Running two or more different voting systems in parallel requires some care. For
example, it must be excluded that voters manage to cast more than one vote,
for instance one in each subsystem. The respective systems in Estonia and
Switzerland have their own mechanisms to avoid this. The Swiss Canton and
Republic of Geneva, for example, issues a voting card that contains a scratch-off
panel with a hidden PIN to access the electronic system [CWS06]. Voters that
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know their PIN can cast their vote electronically. However, a voter needs to
show an untouched scratch-off panel to get access to the ballot-box or voting
booth at the polling-station.
Another problem of running more than one voting system in parallel is the fact
that the overall voting system is at most as secure as each of its subsystems.
If we consider traditional paper-based systems as almost perfectly secure, the
security of the overall voting system is directly determined by the security of
its electronic subsystem. Every possible weakness of the electronic system au-
tomatically poses a security threat to the overall voting system. If for instance
the electronic system issues a receipt to the voters that allows them to prove
a coercer or vote-buyer how they voted, the overall voting system is subject to
fraud. Indeed, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are two of the most diffi-
cult properties to achieve in electronic voting systems [BT94, JCJ05, DKR06].
In this paper, we introduce the concept of a hybrid voting system, which is more
than just running a traditional paper-based and an electronic voting system
in parallel. The idea is to exploit the properties of the paper-based voting
infrastructure to overturn the weaknesses of the electronic system. In particular,
we suggest a vote revocation mechanism, which allows voters to overrule their
electronic votes by casting an additional paper vote at the polling station. The
idea is thus similar to the “re-voting” feature of the Estonian Internet voting
system, in which voters can to cast multiple votes electronically, but such that
only the last vote is taken into account [MM06]. The principle and possible
benefits of counting only the ”last ballot” has first been mentioned in [Skr02].
It is our proposed counter-measure against the vote buying and voter coercion
problem, which is difficult to avoid in pure e-voting systems.
To motivate and define our concept of a hybrid voting system, we start in
Section 2 with a general discussion of the vote buying and voter coercion problem
in electronic voting systems. Then we present our understanding of a hybrid
voting system and explain why they offer coercion-resistance. In Section 3,
we give concrete recommendations of how to build a hybrid system with the
vote revocation feature. To make our analysis as generic as possible, we first
develop a classification of different e-voting systems by looking at the properties
of the underlying electronic ballot-boxes. We will argue that a hybrid system
that prevents vote buying and voter coercion can always be constructed, if the
enclosed electronic voting system guarantees that each voter can unambiguously
identify his vote in the electronic ballot-box. In Section 4, we summarize the
main conclusions of our analysis and refer to some of the open problems.
2 Hybrid Voting Systems
New voting mechanisms will not find acceptance unless they evidently preserve
the security level of traditional paper-based voting. This requirement is inher-
ently difficult to fulfill with e-voting systems, and it seems that it is not fulfilled
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to a satisfactory degree by many of the proposed models or existing systems.
Two serious types of fraud that are particularly difficult to prevent and which
are largely scalable in electronic systems are vote buying and voter coercion. In
the first part of this section, we describe the challenge of building trustworthy
e-voting systems that inherently prevent such types of fraud. Then we show
how hybrid voting systems may offer voters a means of voting electronically
while keeping the possibilities of such types of fraud as scarce as in traditional
paper-based systems.
2.1 Vote Buying and Voter Coercion
Whether or not a system has actually implemented required security features is
not necessarily transparent to the voters. If they feel that their votes may not
even reach the final tally, they might fully restrain from voting electronically and
tend to cast their votes in the traditional way, a means of casting votes still likely
to be available in the near future. By doing so, they witness the vote reaching the
body of the possibly transparent ballot-box. Some countries even allow voters
to attend the tallying procedure and thus to witness the consideration of their
votes in the final outcome. To establish a similar level of voters’ trust in e-voting
systems, it is imperative to give them access to some information that confirms
the correct casting of their votes in a convincing way. This confirmation is meant
to provide individual verifiability, a precondition to trustworthiness of voting
systems. The existence of such a confirmation may thus seem like a feature, but
since it will generally also convince any third party that a particular vote was
cast, it disallows voters to deceive others about their votes. Such information
is thus called a voter’s receipt [BT94]. Its existence is a violation of the voter’s
privacy, because it opens doors to the following two types of fraud, in which the
adversary gets the voter to vote in a prescribed way [Skr02].
Vote Buying. The voter will be rewarded by the vote buyer for voting in a
particular manner. To receive the reward, the voter may actively co-
operate with the vote buyer, e.g. by deviating from the normal voting
procedure to construct a receipt.
Voter Coercion. The voter is put under pressure or threatened by a coercer
for voting in a particular manner. Here, the voter may only consent to
co-operate with the vote buyer as long as the threat is perceived as real.
Note that both forms of exploiting a voting system are largely scalable in an
electronic environment. A vote buyer could simply set up a web site explaining
the conditions for making easy money, while a coercer could easily post his
threats to thousands of voters. In both cases, the attack is only interesting to
potential adversaries as long as voters are able to prove them how they voted.
Without a receipt, a corrupted voter could simply lie about the vote cast, i.e.,
the motivation of an adversary even launching such an attack in the first place
is likely to be as low as with paper-based votes.
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Clearly, it must be a primary objective to establish an e-voting system that
is immune to all sorts of vote buying and voter coercion attacks, including
those in which the adversary gets the voter to abstain from voting or to vote
at random. Systems blessed with that immunity are called coercion-resistant
[JCJ05, DKR06]. Note that coercion-resistance is stronger than mere receipt-
freeness [BT94, JV06], which alone does not prevent adversaries from get-
ting voters to abstain from voting. In the literature, there are many sugges-
tions for receipt-free or coercion-resistant systems, but most of them rely on
unrealistic technical assumptions such as untappable communication channels
[BT94, Oka97, HS00, MBC01, LBD+03, DKR06, XS06, MN06, CLW08].
2.2 Hybrid Systems
A hybrid voting system offers every voter the choice between either casting a
vote electronically or casting a traditional paper vote at the polling station. The
key to undermining the possibility of exploiting the electronic subsystem for the
above-mentioned types of fraud is to allow the voters to revoke their electronic
votes at the polling station. Revocation can be followed by casting the vote of
personal choice in the traditional way, i.e., inside the (presumably) coercion-free
environment of the polling station. Clearly, the revocation mechanism must be
designed in a way that an adversary can not find out which votes have been
revoked. In Section 3, we will propose two different solutions to that problem.
Both solutions include three different ballot-boxes: the α-box for the electronic
votes, the β-box for the vote revocations, and the γ-box for the paper votes.
The final outcome Σ of the voting can then be calculated as
Σ = α− β + γ,
where α, β, γ denote the individual results of the respective ballot-boxes.1 This
model with three ballot-boxes is illustrated in Figure 1. Depending on the
revocation mechanism, the β-box may contain revocations either in electronic
form or on paper. Clearly, each vote in the β-box must reflect the corresponding
vote from the α-box.
Coercion-Resistance. In a hybrid system with a vote revocation procedure,
even if an adversary is contently convinced that the voter cast the electronic vote
as told, there is still the possibility that the vote will be overruled by the voter’s
personal choice and thus not be considered in the final tally. Only by witnessing
the voter entering the polling station, it becomes apparent to the coercer that
the voter’s intention is most likely to revoke the vote. However, monitoring the
entrance of a polling station is not easily scalable to a large number of corrupted
voters. Furthermore, since the possibility of hindering voters from going to the
1We do not further specify here whether the ballot-boxes contain simple yes/no-votes or
more complicated 1-out-of-n or k-out-of-n selections. In the latter cases, Σ = α− β + γ must
be applied component-wise to each of the n options.
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Figure 1: Three types of ballot-boxes and voters in a hybrid voting system:
Voter A votes electronically; Voter B first votes electronically, but then overrules
it by a paper vote; Voter C votes on paper.
polling station is also given in traditional, well-accepted paper-based systems,
it does not prevent hybrid systems from reaching the same level of coercion-
resistance as their traditional counterparts.
We conclude that if adversaries must assume that corrupted voters will usually
revoke their votes, a hybrid system is clearly coercion-resistant: an attack would
simply seem too expensive. We believe that it is possible for governments to
invoke that perception among adversaries, for instance by explicitly allowing
voters to co-operate with vote buyers and coercers, however only as long as
they revoke their biased vote.
Prerequisites. Remarkably, pure electronic voting systems and the electronic
subsystems of hybrid voting systems do not necessarily share the same prerequi-
sites. For example, the great challenge of removing receipts from pure e-voting
systems does no longer apply to the electronic components of a hybrid voting
system. Not that receipts are only admitted, their guaranteed presence may
even be a prerequisite in the design of a hybrid system. One of the proposed
methods in Section 3 requires such guaranteed receipts. In general, we are less
restrictive by imposing the following two key prerequisites for the e-voting com-
ponent of a hybrid voting system.
1. The system guarantees the presence of a vote identifier, to ensure that the
voters can identify the votes in the α-box that were generated using their
credentials. Receipts are special cases of such vote identifiers.
2. The system provides some mechanism that allows voting officials at the
polling station to check whether or not a registered voter has already cast
an electronic vote.
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Note that in general the guaranteed existence of a vote identifier (1st prereq-
uisite) is insufficient for the voting officials to verify whether someone has cast
an electronic vote or not (2nd prerequisite). Because if such an identifier is
secret to the voter, then the existence of the electronic vote could be concealed
by simply withholding the identifier. Similarly, the existence of a mechanism
to check if somebody has already voted electronically (2nd prerequisite) is in
general not enough to identify that person’s vote in the α-box (1st prerequisite),
because the system may provide a list of voters that is completely disconnected
from the list of votes.
In the absence of a receipt, the first prerequisite can be met by leaving the
encrypted vote attached to information that publicly identifies the voter. In
order to preserve the voters’ privacy, the individual votes clearly may never be
decrypted in this case, not even at the time of tallying. Instead, homomor-
phic methods for tallying exist, where only the result of the tally needs to be
decrypted [CGS97, HS00]. By applying this method, even the second require-
ment is inherently met. We thus conclude that the prerequisites we impose
on the electronic subsystem of a hybrid system do not form obstacles that are
particularly hard to overcome.
3 Vote Revocations in Hybrid Systems
We now consider construction of a coercion-resistant hybrid voting system. To
prevent vote buying and voter coercion, we need to define a secure vote re-
vocation mechanism that allows voters to update their electronic votes at the
polling station. For the solution presented in this section, we assume that the
electronic subsystem provides the two key prerequisites discussed at the end of
the previous section. We assume thus the existence of an electronic ballot-box,
in which the electronic votes are collected (the α-box). Additionally, we suppose
that the traditional voting infrastructure satisfies the following three minimal
requirements.
1. The traditional voting infrastructure consists of a polling station, where
the paper votes of registered voters are anonymously collected in a physical
ballot-box (the γ-box).
2. The traditional voting procedure at the polling station (checking the iden-
tity of voters, opening the ballot-box, counting the votes, etc.) is suffi-
ciently secure, in particular coercion-resistant, and the group of voting
officials is reliable and trustworthy.
3. The official voting period at the polling station chronologically succeeds
the electronic voting period.
To understand the applicability of the proposed vote revocation procedures, we
first need to get an overview of the different types of electronic ballot-boxes in e-
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voting systems. The result of this discussion in Subsection 3.1 is a classification
of e-voting systems, from which two fundamentally different situations emerge.
For each of these cases, we propose in Subsection 3.2 a corresponding vote
revocation procedure that fits into the proposed counting scheme of a hybrid
system.
3.1 Classification of E-Voting Systems
A common core component of all existing e-voting systems is an electronic ballot-
box, in which votes are collected during the voting period. One can think of it
as a database with two basic operations for adding new entries and reading its
content. To ensure the availability and the correctness of these operations, and
to guarantee the integrity and consistency of the database, a variety of security
measures need to be implemented. Some of these measures aim at avoiding
so-called single points of failure, i.e., critical components capable of causing the
entire system to fail.
Depending on the chosen configuration and properties of the electronic ballot-
box and the structure of its entries, different e-voting systems emerge. In the
remainder of this subsection, we will make a distinction between black box and
bulletin board systems, anonymous and non-anonymous boards, identifiable and
non-identifiable board entries, and the presence or absence of a receipt. In
Figure 2, we give a first overview of this classification and indicate where vote
revocations are possible.
Bulletin Board Systems
E-Voting Systems
Black Box Systems
✓
Anonymous Board Non-Anonymous Board
Unidentifiable
✗
Receipt
✓
Receipt-free
✓
Identifiable
✓
(Procedure 1)(Procedure 2) (Procedure 2)
Figure 2: Classification of existing e-voting systems with different types of elec-
tronic ballot-boxes. The check marks indicate where vote revocations are pos-
sible.
Black Box vs. Bulletin Board Systems. E-voting systems mainly differ
in the type of database access they provide. There are two extreme cases, one
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in which the access is restricted to a few authorized persons only, and one in
which everybody can add new entries to the database and read its content (while
deleting entries is always prohibited). E-voting systems of the first category are
sometimes called black box voting systems [HA03, KKW06]. They are very pop-
ular in commercial solutions and in political e-voting projects. An advantage of
black box systems is that from a cryptographic point of view, they are relatively
simple to understand and implement. On the other hand, they are often crit-
icized as not providing enough transparency, i.e., neither providing individual
verifiability, nor allowing the outcome to be publicly verified.
The second major category comprises systems with a public bulletin board,
through which all cast votes are visible to everybody [Pet05]. To ensure the
secrecy of the votes and the fairness of the voting process, the board’s entries
need to be encrypted (at least during the official voting period). The purpose
of the public board is to allow all voters to verify the inclusion of their votes
in the electronic ballot-box and the correctness of the counting. Most system
proposals in the academic e-voting literature are based on such bulletin boards.
Anonymous vs. Non-Anonymuous Boards. In bulletin board systems,
there are two opposed sub-categories, each defined by whether the entries on
the board are anonymous or not. In the case of anonymous boards, there must be
an additional mechanism to exclude votes from unauthorized voters or multiple
votes from the same voter. Examples of such mechanisms are mix nets [Cha81]
or blind signatures [Cha82]. If the board entries are not anonymous, for example
if they contain a unique voter ID that attributes them unambiguously to the
respective voters, there must be a mechanism that prevents the decryption of
single votes. Systems of that type are usually based on homomorphic encryption
schemes with a shared public key [CGS97, HS00]. Clearly, in those systems,
the publicly known voter ID serves as the vote identifier.
Vote Identifiers vs. Receipts. Another distinguishing feature of bulletin
board systems concerns the board entries themselves. There are three basic
types: those which can be identified and disclosed with a receipt, those which
can only be identified with a vote identifier (but not disclosed), and those which
are completely unidentifiable. In the case of a non-anonymous board, where the
identification of the votes is given intrinsically, only two types of board entries
remain, those with a receipt and those without. These cases are depicted at the
bottom of the tree shown in Figure 2.
3.2 Vote Revocation
In the classification tree of the previous subsection, four cases are tagged with
a check mark and one is crossed out. The cross means that the case of an
anonymous board with unidentifiable board entries is not compatible with any
vote revocation procedure. The missing vote identifier makes it impossible to
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either remove the vote from the electronic ballot-box or to subtract it from the
final tally. Note that by explicitly requiring the existence of vote identifiers at
the end of Section 3, we have ruled out this case from the beginning.
In black box systems, it is possible to install a vote revocation mechanism as
long as the electronic votes in the ballot-box remain identifiable. Due to the lack
of transparency offered by such systems, the correct application of a potential
revocation mechanism can not be verified by the public. We therefore leave
revocations using a black box approach undiscussed.
Procedure 1: Revocations on Paper. The first procedure we propose
assumes that every voter owns a receipt for his vote in the α-box. It does not
matter whether the board is anonymous or not, but it is crucial that the voter
(and not the coercer or vote buyer alone) is in possession of the receipt. The
payoff of this restriction is a revocation procedure that particularly appeals by
its simplicity.
The following points define the procedure. We start off when the voter at the
polling station is about to revoke the electronic vote in the α-box (we assume
that the voting officials have already successfully checked the voter’s identity
and right to vote).
1. The voter uses the receipt to locate the encrpyted vote in the α-box and
reveal it towards the voting officials.
2. The voting officials prepare a revocation paper ballot containing the same
vote and hand it over to the voter.
3. The voting officials verifiy that the voter drops the revocation paper ballot
into the β-box.
4. The voter is granted access to the γ-box to cast the final paper vote.
In this procedure, the β-box is thus a physical ballot-box similar to the γ-box.
At the end of the official voting period, it is opened and tallied according to the
same procedure.
Note that in the scheme as it is proposed, it is crucial to assume that the voting
officials will not allow the voters to cast a paper ballot that differs from their
electronic votes in the α-box. If not all voting officials are fully trustworthy,
then several voting officials should be involved in each step of the procedure.
In other words, before the voter gets access to the γ-box, a sufficient number
of voting officials would have to give their approval, for instance by signing the
revocation ballot. Thus, we merely need to assume that among the group of
involved voting officials, there is at least one that would refuse the signature to
an incorrect revocation ballot.
A drawback of this procedure is the fact that the content of the electronic vote
must be revealed to the voting officials. One could argue that this violates the
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anonymity of the vote, because in a simple yes/no-type of voting, one could
guess that revoking a yes-vote implies that the update will be a no-vote, and
vice versa. But since such conclusions will always remain speculative, i.e. it can
not be excluded that the original and the updated votes are identical, we think
that this is an unpleasant but acceptable side effect.
Note, that by requiring instead of avoiding a receipt, we sharply depart from the
mainstream approach of taking additional measures to make electronic voting
systems receipt-free. Yet, the following procedure shows how vote revocations
can be realized even without receipts.
Procedure 2: Electronic Revocations. Let the e-voting component of the
hybrid system now be a system that provides a mere vote identifier, not nec-
essarily a receipt. The idea then is to leave the votes encrypted throughout
the whole revocation procedure. To guarantee to anonymity of the those who
decide to revoke their votes, and thus to ensure the overall system to remain
coercion-resistant, we define the β-box as an anonymous bulletin board onto
which re-encryptions of the original votes are posted. The adversary is then un-
able to make out which votes from the α-box have been revoked. The electronic
voting environment must therefore comply with the following requirements.
• The β-box must be an anonymous bulletin board.
• The encryption scheme used to generate the encrypted votes in the α-box
must allow re-encryption2 and the generation of a non-transferable proof
of correct re-encryption.3
The following points define the procedure.
1. The voter generates a re-encryption of the encrypted vote in the α-box.
2. A corresponding non-transferable proof of correct re-encryption is gener-
ated, designated to the voting officials at the polling station. Optionally,
this step can be done remotely in a non-interactive manner, given the
existence of trusted software.
3. The voter approaches the voting officials and uses the vote identifier to
identify the encrypted vote in the α-box.
2Let w = E(v, r) be the encrypted vote, where E is a randomized encryption function with
randomization factor r. Then w′ = R(w, r′) denotes the re-encryption of w, such that the
decryptions of w and w′ are identical, i.e., v = D(w) = D(w′).
3A proof of correct re-encryption allows a prover to convince a verifier that w′ is indeed a re-
encryption R(w, r′) of w, without revealing the randomization factor r′. A proof constructed
as an interactive Σ-protocol is inherently non-transferable, i.e., only the involved verifier will be
convinced of its correctness [BG92]. Corresponding non-interactive protocols are transferable,
but there is a general way of extending them to be convincing to a designated verifier only
[JSI96].
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4. The voter hands the re-encryption and the corresponding non-transferable
proof over the voting officials.
5. If the proof is accepted, the voting officials post the re-encrypted vote to
the β-box.
6. The voter is granted access to the γ-box to cast the final paper vote.
The β-box is tallied according to the procedure defined for the α-box.
Similar to the previous procedure, we can enhance it by requiring a sufficient
number of voting officials to approve the voter’s re-encryption: A voter would
only be granted access to the γ-box once a sufficient number of voting officials
have posted their electronic signature of the re-encryption to the bulletin board.
Clearly, the randomization factor the voter used for his re-encryption serves
him as a receipt; He can always prove to an adversary that he has revoked
his electronic vote. However, he will never be interested in doing so. On the
other hand, the receipt does not help at proving to an adversary that he did not
revoke his vote. It thus does not reduce the security level of the overall system.
4 Conclusion
Governments around the world intend to offer their citizens e-voting as a com-
fortable way to express their political preferences. Yet, it seems that the tradi-
tional paper-based schemes are not likely to disappear for quite some decades.
Defining procedures to intergrate both means of casting votes to an overall vot-
ing system clearly poses an inherent necessity. We propose our understanding
of hybrid voting systems as a solution to this challenge. By introducing the
anonymous β-box and by exploiting the traditional polling station as a pro-
tective environment, we allow voters to revoke their electronically casted votes.
We argue why such an approach yields coercion-resistance, even if the electronic
subsystem were indeed subject to coercion when disallowing revocation at the
polling station. In a hybrid system, we are therefore given the freedom to have
the e-voting subsystem grant receipts to satisfy individual verifiability, with-
out introducing the risk of vote buying or voter coercion. Thus, hybrid voting
systems offer voters trustworthy, coercion-resistant e-voting.
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